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In  1967, Alvin Go l dm a n  proposed  that  a person X knows that  p only 
if  the fact tha t  p is causally connected with X ' s  belief that  p.1 In  the same 
journal  issue, Brian Skyrms produced an alleged counterexample:  
Let us suppose that 'Z's head has been cut off' ('Fa') is causally sufficient for 'Z is 
dead' ('Ga'). X is walking along the street and notices Z lying in the gutter, with head 
severed from body. On the basis of his background knowledge, he arrives at the belief 
that Z is dead. Sure enough, Z is dead. Now suppose that the sequence of events leading 
to this pretty scene were as follows: Z was lying in the street, drunk and motionless. 
Then he died of a heart attack. Finally, a fiend chanced upon the scene and, seeing a 
man lying in the gutter (but not knowing he was dead) he whacked off his head. 
Notice that, in the ordinary sense of 'cause', Z's losing his head was not the cause of 
death. In fact, it is not even causally connected with his death. Nevertheless, this would 
not prevent us from granting that X knew that Z was dead. ~ 
Recently, this case has won  wide acceptance as a counterexample to 
Go ldman ' s  causal theory o f  knowledge:  f rom Rober t  Ackermann,  Gilbert 
Harman ,  and Marshall  Swain. a Of  these, only Swain believes tha t  
Go ldman ' s  theory  can be modified to accommodate  the Skyrms case. 
I argue below that  the Skyrms case is not  a counterexample to Go ldman ' s  
original theory. To see this, we must  at tend to the difference between 
a person 's  death and a person 's  being dead, and to distinctions related to 
tha t  between causat ion arid causal overdetermination.  4 
Some events, conditions, and states o f  affairs are causally overde- 
termined. Fo r  example, a short  circuit starts a fire in a house 's  kitchen. 
A t  the same time, a cigarette ash starts a fire in the master  bedroom.  
Either fire alone would have spread and destroyed the house completely 
in one hour.  In  one hour  the house is completely destroyed - its destruc- 
t ion is causally overdetermined. In  these circumstances, the short  circuit 
and the cigarette ash are causally overdetermining factors, or  causal 
overdeterminants,  o f  the house 's  destruction. There is some reluctance to 
say o f  these factors that  they are, strictly speaking, causes  of  the house 's  
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destruction. (Perhaps this is because neither the short circuit nor the 
cigarette ash was necessary for the house's destruction, even in the 
circumstances.) For this reason, I use the term 'cause' in a strict sense 
such that causal overdeterminants are not causes; and I use the term 
'C-condition' to embrace both strict causes and causal overdeterminants. 5 
Others use 'cause' more liberally in a way which coincides with my use of  
'C-condition'.  
Goldman holds that X knows that  p only if the fact that p is causally 
connected with X's  belief that p. He says that two events, conditions, or 
states of  affairs are causally connected just in case either one is a cause 
of  the other or both have a cause in common. 6 Should 'cause' in the 
account of  'causal connections' be interpreted narrowly to coincide with 
'cause' in my strict sense, or liberally to coincide with 'C-condit ion'? 
I t  is clear that Goldman uses 'cause' liberally. In a footnote, he considers 
". . .  a table top that is supported by four legs. When a fifth leg is inserted 
flush beneath the table top, it too becomes a cause of the table top 's  not 
falling." 7 In my terminology,the fifth leg is a causal overdeterminant and 
a C-condition, but not a cause, of  the table top 's  not falling. We now 
know how to interpret Goldman:  the fact that p is causally connected 
with X's  belief that p just in case either the fact that  p is a C-condition 
of X 's  belief that p, or both have a C-condition in common. 
In the Skyrms case, X sees that Z ' s  head is severed, and infers that  
" Z  is dead" or " Z  was dead". Presumably, X does not infer that Z was 
dead ten years before. I f  X is circumspect, he will note that 'Z's head has 
been cut off by t '  is causally sufficient for ' Z  is dead at t + e ' ,  where 
epsilon represents some slight time lag. Suppose X encounters the de- 
capitated body at time t 4. Then X knows that  Z ' s  head is severed by t 4 
and Xinfers that Z is dead at t 4 + e (P). Is the fact that p causally connected 
with X's  belief that p?  The sequence of events can be diagrammed as 
follows (arrows are to be read: " . . .  is a C-condition for . . . " ) :  
Z ' s h e a r t  Z 's  Z i s  Z i s  Z i s  
attack --rdeath--~dead ~dead*dead 
Z's  head Z i s  Z i s  
is severed-~dead--*dead 
t l  t2 t3 t3 + e 14 + e 
Z ' s  death is not causally overdetermined; the heart attack in particular 
A H E A D Y  A T T E M P T  TO B E F I E N D  C A U S A L  THEORIES 333  
is a (strict) cause and not a causal overdeterminant of  Z ' s  death. Similarly, 
Z ' s  being dead at each moment  f rom t z up until ta+e is not causally 
overdetermined; the heart attack is therefore a (strict) cause of  Z ' s  being 
dead at each of these moments.  These features of  the Skyrms case easily 
obscure the fact that  at t3 + o and thereafter Z ' s  being dead is causally 
overdetermined; the heart attack and the severing are causal over- 
determinants (and hence C-conditions but not strict causes) o f  Z ' s  being 
dead at ta +o and thereafter (and at t4+~ in particular). 
I f  the severing had by chance occurred at t z_ ~, Z ' s  dea th  would have 
been causally overdetermined, and it would be obvious that  Z ' s  being 
dead at any particular time is causally overdetermined. The fact that  
the severing comes after death makes no difference. In this respect, the 
severing is like the fifth leg inserted flush beneath a table top already 
supported by four legs. The fifth leg is a causal overdeterminant of  the 
table top 's  not falling at times a f t e r  the fifth leg has been inserted. The 
severing is a causal overdeterminant of  Z ' s  being dead at times a f t e r  the 
severing has occurred. 
I have pointed out that  the severing is a causal overdeterminant, and 
hence a C-condition, of  the fact that  p, Z ' s  being dead at t 4 + 6. The sever- 
ing is clearly a cause, and hence a C-condition, of  X 's  belief that  p:  the 
severing is a cause of Z ' s  head's being separated f rom his body after t a; X 
sees head and body so separated at t 4, and infers that  p, that  Z is dead at 
t4+, (both seeing and inference are assumed to be causal processes). The 
fact that p and X 's  belief that p are therefore causally connected; they 
have a C-condition in common,  the severing, s 
Previous discussions of  the Skyrms case overlook this causal connec- 
tion because they confuse the fact that p, a state of  affairs at t4+ ~, with 
Z ' s  death, an event at t 2. Thus we have: 
(Skyrms)... Z's losing his head.., is not even causally connected with his death.., this 
would not preclude us from granting that X knew that Z was dead. 
(Ackermann) ... a knows that Brown is dead, but it happens that there is no causal chain 
connecting death and decapitation. 
(Harman) ... you come to know that he is dead.., having his head cut off did not cause 
Omar's death, since he was already dead. 
(Swain) Even though you know tbat he is dead.., there is no event in the causal chain 
leading to your belief that his head has been severed from his body which is also in 
fact causally responsible for his death .... 9 
All such points are irrelevant since there is a causal connection, via  the 
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severing, between X's belief that Z is dead at t4+ e and Z ' s  being dead 
at t4+o. The Skyrms case is not a counterexample to Goldman's causal 
theory of knowledge. 
The quotations above might suggest that a minor modification of the 
Skyrms case will yield a counterexample after all. Is not the real point 
that X knows that Z died, even though Z ' s  death, or dying, is not causally 
connected with X's belief that Z died? If  X infers that Z died from his 
(knowledge constituting) belief that Z is dead at t4+~, we want to say 
that I" knows that Z died. Goldman's analysis requires that Z ' s  dying 
is causally connected with X's belief that Z died. Is this condition 
satisfied? 
In the article introducing his causal theory of knowledge, Goldman 
stated the following principle: 
(GP) if q is logically related to p, 
and if p is a cause of z, 
then q is a cause of z. 1~ 
GP (Goldman's principle) has been stated carelessly. I f  p and q are 
logically related, they are presumably statements or propositions. But 
statements and propositions are not causes. Goldman should have said: 
(GP') if q is logically related to p, 
and if the fact that p is a cause of z, 
then the fact that q is a cause of z. 
Substituting "is causally connected with" for both occurrences of "is a 
cause o f "  yields a modest generalization of GP' :  
(GGP')  if q is logically related to p, 
and if the fact that p is causally connected with z, 
then the fact that q is causally connected with z. 
GGP'  is easily applied to the modified Skyrms example. In the special 
case where z is X's belief that q, GGP '  reads: 
if q is logically related to p, 
and if the fact that p is causally connected with 
X's belief that q, 
then the fact that q is causally connected with 
X's belief that q. 
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" Z  is dead at t 4 + ~" (p) is logically related to " Z  died" (q) because the 
former entails the latter. Given (as I have shown above) that the fact 
that p is causally connected with X's  belief that p, and given that X's  
belief that p is a cause of  X's belief that q (by inference), the fact that p is 
causally connected with X's belief that q. (The fact that p and X's belief 
that q have a C-condition in common, the severing). It follows by GGP'  
that the fact that q is causally connected with X's belief that q. That is, 
Z ' s  dying is causally connected with X's belief that Z died in Goldman's 
sense of "causally connected". 11 The modified Skyrms case would be a 
counterexample to Goldman's original analysis without the modest 
generalization of GP'.  I am certain that Skyrms and those following him 
in the use of the mad fiend case have not wanted to show the conditions 
of  Goldman's analysis too strong in this trivially reparable respect. In 
any case, the modified Skyrms case is not a counterexample to Goldman's 
analysis as revised above. 
One might object, on various grounds, to GP'  (and hence to GGP' )  
itself. It is my own view that there are serious problems both for these 
principles, and for other features of Goldman's causal theory of  knowl- 
edge. I do not want to defend that theory. I do want correctly to locate 
the serious difficulties for that theory. The original Skyrms case is the 
most visible and repeated objection to Goldman's analysis; it has been 
treated as a simple and devastating counterexample which has cleared the 
way for ready dismissal of the theory. In fact, it is no counterexample at 
all. The modified Skyrms case fares no better. I hope I have contributed 
to undermining the role of these alleged counterexamples in philosophical 
discussion. 
The University of  Michigan 
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